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Abstract Notoriously, the Einstein equations of general relativity have so-
lutions in which closed timelike curves (CTCs) occur. On these
curves time loops back onto itself, which has exotic consequences:
for example, traveling back into one’s own past becomes possible.
However, in order to make time travel stories consistent constraints
have to be satisfied, which prevents seemingly ordinary and plausi-
ble processes from occurring. This, and several other “unphysical”
features, have motivated many authors to exclude solutions with
CTCs from consideration, e.g. by conjecturing a chronology pro-
tection law.
In this contribution we shall investigate the nature of one particular
class of exotic consequences of CTCs, namely those involving unex-
pected cases of indeterminism or determinism. Indeterminism arises
even against the backdrop of the usual deterministic physical the-
ories when CTCs do not cross spacelike hypersurfaces outside of a
limited CTC-region￿such hypersurfaces fail to be Cauchy surfaces.
We shall compare this CTC-indeterminism with four other types of
indeterminism that have been discussed in the philosophy of physics
literature: quantum indeterminism, the indeterminism of the hole
argument, non-uniqueness of solutions of diﬀerential equations (as
in Norton’s dome) and lack of predictability due to insuﬃcient data.
By contrast, a certain kind of determinism appears to arise when an
indeterministic theory is applied on a CTC: things cannot be diﬀer-
ent from what they already were. Again we shall make comparisons,
this time with other cases of determination in physics.
We shall argue that on further consideration both this indetermin-
ism and determinism on CTCs turn out to possess analogues in
other, familiar areas of physics. CTC-indeterminism is close to
the epistemological indeterminism we know from statistical physics,
while the “fixedness” typical of CTC-determinism is pervasive in
physics. CTC-determinism and CTC-indeterminism therefore do
not provide incontrovertible grounds for rejecting CTCs as concep-
tually inadmissible.
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1 Introduction
There have been extensive discussions in the philosophical and physical lit-
erature of the last couple of decades about the possibilities of time travel:
the existence of solutions of the Einstein equations in which closed time-
like curves (CTCs) occur has endowed the science-fictional character of the
subject with a certain amount of scientific respectability. That the Ein-
stein equations of general relativity do not exclude the existence of CTCs is
easy to see. The Einstein equations impose local conditions on spacetime:
the local curvature properties must stand in a definite relation to the local
energy and momentum of the matter fields. As long as these local condi-
tions remain satisfied, the global topology of the spacetime may vary. Now,
one particular solution of the Einstein equations is Minkowski spacetime, in
which the curvature vanishes everywhere (Minkowski spacetime is flat) and
in which there is no matter (all components of the energy-momentum tensor
are zero). From this Minkowski spacetime we can build a new solution of
the Einstein equations, with a diﬀerent topology, by the simple operation
of identifying two spacelike hypersurfaces (one “in the future”, and one “in
the past”). Concretely, we cut a strip out of Minkowski spacetime and glue
the upper and lower ends together. The cylindrical spacetime that results (a
strip of Minkowski spacetime rolled up in the time direction) features CTCs:
timelike worldlines going straight up in the time direction return to their
exact starting points.
It is helpful to keep this simple example of CTCs provided by rolled-up
Minkowski spacetime in mind during the discussion of strange features of
CTCs below. However, it should not be thought that CTCs only arise by
(arguably artificial) cut-and-paste constructions: there are quite a number
of solutions of the Einstein equations known in which apparently plausible
matter distributions give rise to CTCs. The most famous solution with CTCs
was found by Kurt Go¨del (Go¨del, 1949, [14]). The Go¨del solution describes
a non-expanding, rotating universe with a large cosmological constant. This
Go¨del world is conceptually important, even though it has properties that
conflict with what we empirically find in our universe. A solution of the Ein-
stein equations that may be more relevant for our own world is that of a part
of spacetime with a spinning black hole (described by the Kerr metric), in
which a region with CTCs exists, the ergosphere (see, for example, Carroll,
2014, [2], p. 261.). There are also other, less drastic mass-energy distribu-
tions that feature CTCs, such as the first metric with CTC-properties to be
discovered: van Stockum’s rotating cylinder of dust particles (van Stockum,
1937, [24]).
It should be added that it is unclear whether the existence of these and
similar solutions has the implication that there are possibilities for building
a “time machine”. The construction of a manageable time machine would
require the creation of a singularity-free compact spacetime region in which
CTCs occur, and results by Hawking and others indicate that this cannot be
realized within classical general relativity because of energy-conditions that
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have to be satisfied by the matter fields (Hawking, 1992, [15]). In a quantum
theory of general relativity there might be more room for time machines, but
this remains speculative in view of the absence of a full quantum gravity the-
ory. However, we are not concerned with the question whether it is possible
to construct a useful time machine, but rather with the conceptual status per
se of CTCs, in relativistic worlds in general.
It is immediately clear that CTCs give rise to causal oddities. If someone
could go back into his own past, even if not in our universe but in another
physically possible world, it seems that he could change things there in such
a way that logical inconsistencies result. The notorious example is the grand-
father paradox: if a time traveler arrives at a point in his past at which his
grandfather is still an infant, he could decide to kill the child. But if this
were to be successful, it would obviously conflict with the very fact of the
time traveler’s own existence. So in order to have a consistent history on a
CTC, certain consistency conditions have to be fulfilled. These conditions
take the form of restrictions on what can happen. Although in the case of
the grandfather paradox it is plausible at first sight that the time traveler
can do whatever is within his capabilities when meeting his grandfather, he
nevertheless must be constrained in his actions. This points into the direc-
tion of a determinism that is stricter than what we are used to in physics;
this is one of the points to be further discussed below.
In contrast, there are also cases in which the presence of CTCs appears
to lead to a weakening of usual notions of determinism. Think of a space-
time that is globally Minkowski-like, but in which there is a finite region
containing CTCs that are causally closed within themselves, so that nothing
happens on them which has a cause external to the CTC. Closed worldlines
of inertially moving particles would be an example. Since there is no causal
relation to anything outside such worldlines, the processes that take place in
the CTC region cannot be predicted from outside that region. This lack of
predictability points into the direction of indeterminism, the other issue to
be discussed in more detail below.
The threats posed by logical inconsistency, causal anomalies and other
strange features have sometimes been adduced to declare the possibility of
CTCs “unphysical”. CTCs should perhaps be ruled out by a “cosmic censor-
ship principle” (Penrose, 1968, [20]) or a “chronology protection principle”
(Hawking, 1992, [15]). The motivation behind conjecturing that such a prin-
ciple is at work is that the alternative, with its CTC extravagances, goes
against the very nature of physics: such features occur nowhere else in ex-
isting physical theory or practice. This then is taken to justify the inductive
conclusion that they cannot happen at all.
In this paper we shall critically analyze this argument for the impossibility
of cases of “unphysical determinism and indeterminism.” As we shall argue, it
is not accurate to say that the “causal anomalies” associated with CTCs form
a category of their own. Indeed, there exist similar cases in standard physics,
and these cases are not considered to be exotic or even strange. Therefore,
we shall conclude, such a priori objections are not insuperable and hence at
least part of the motivation for the dismissal of CTCs falls away.
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2 Closed Timelike Curves and Logical Consis-
tency
2.1 A Toy Model: Deutsch-Politzer Spacetime
A spacetime that is a bit more complicated than the rolled-up version of
Minkowski spacetime that we considered in the Introduction, and which
is suitable for illustrating our arguments, is the so-called Deutsch-Politzer
spacetime (Deutsch, 1991, [5]; Politzer, 1992, [21]). It can be realized by
making two cuts in flat Minkowski spacetime, as indicated in Figure 4￿the
points in these cuts are removed from the manifold. The two inner edges
of the cuts are subsequently identified (glued together); the same happens
with the two outer edges. When a particle hits L  from below it will travel
onward from the upper side of L+. The other way around, a particle hitting
the lower side of L+ will reappear at the upper side of L . This creates a
region where CTCs can occur: vertical lines, which represent particles at rest
(in the depicted frame of reference) that would loop back onto themselves,
as depicted by the particle worldline in the figure.
This cut-and-paste operation results in Minkowski spacetime with a kind
of “handle”, the latter having the internal topological properties of a rolled-
up strip of Minkowski spacetime. The spacetime region of the handle can be
entered from the rest of spacetime, namely from the two sides, on the left
and on the right, where the handle merges with the surrounding spacetime.
One can think of this spacetime as global Minkowski spacetime, which at two
singular points makes contact with a rolled-up strip of Minkowski spacetime.1
Because worldlines inside the handle do not cross the spacelike hyper-
surface ⌃ (see Figure 4), ⌃ is not a Cauchy surface: specification of the
physical state on ⌃ does not fix the physical state on the whole manifold.
In particular, there is no information available on ⌃ about what happens
inside the handle. There is consequently a “Cauchy horizon”, which limits
the part of spacetime that can be predicted from ⌃. The unpredictable part
comprises the handle, and also the two future lightcones with their apexes in
the two singular endpoints of the handle. In Figure 4 these two singularities
are represented by the two ends (on the left and right, respectively) of the
lower cut. Since the singularities are not part of the manifold, they cannot
contain initial conditions for worldlines that “come out of them” (this is a
figurative way of speaking, since the singular points are not in the manifold
and therefore not on any curve in the manifold￿the past parts of the world-
lines in question asymptotically approach one of the singularities). These
1It has been shown that for the Deutsch-Politzer spacetime it is not possible to smooth
out the metric such that we would obtain a global nonsingular asympotically flat Lorentzian
metric (Chamblin et al., 1994, [3]). This is because the end points of the “cuts” are singu-
larities: as judged from the surrounding Minkowski spacetime, there is a finite spacetime
interval between the lower and upper end points on both sides, but seen from the inside
these points are identical. These two singularities raise questions about the empirical
plausibility of Deutsch-Politzer spacetime. Nevertheless, consideration of this spacetime
is helpful as it makes visualization of finite CTC-regions possible; our conclusions will not
depend on a commitment to this or another specific spacetime..
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Figure 4: Deutsch-Politzer spacetime, picture is based on (Arntzenius & Maudlin, 2013). L+
and L  represent the ‘cuts’ in Minkowski spacetime; the lower side of L+ is identified with the
upper side of L , while the lower side of L  is identified with the upper side of L+. This can
be visualized as a “handle" on Minkowski spacetime, which particles may enter and leave again
(in contrast with the rolled-up cylinder). ⌃ is a spacelike hypersurface outside of the
CTC-region; it is not a Cauchy surface. The green line represents a particle at rest, with a
closed timelike worldline.
Figure 5: A particle traveling through Deutsch-Politzer spacetime. The particle enters the
CTC-region with a certain velocity, and after hitting L+ five times, it continues its path in the
outer Minkowskian region. Picture is based on (Arntzenius and Maudlin, 2013).
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worldlines do not have a starting point, and can in this respect be compared
to worldlines coming in from infinity. There is no origin of such worldlines
whose properties determine their nature or number. Clearly therefore, data
available on ⌃ cannot fix what is beyond the Cauchy horizon.
2.2 Consistency Constraints: The Grandfather ‘Para-
dox’
In the region of the handle in Deutsch-Politzer spacetime CTCs occur. These
CTCs raise questions about the consistency of histories and the determination
of events, as already mentioned in the Introduction.
For example, a person whose worldline is one of these CTCs will return
into his own past, where he must find himself in exactly the same state as
on earlier occasions. This uniqueness is simply a logical consequence of the
demand that histories on the CTC must be unambiguous: there has to be
exactly one physical state of aﬀairs at each point of the CTC. This uniqueness
gives rise to a consistency constraint: We can only have solutions that are
consistent in the sense that they consist of well-defined unambiguous events
along the CTC. This is a logical truism and as such a harmless requirement.
Nevertheless, in the present context these consistency constraints introduce
a restriction on possible histories that seems counter-intuitive and leads to
what Smeenk and Wu¨trich (2011, [22], p. 7) call modal paradoxes, of which
the grandfather paradox is a concrete instance.
In the grandfather paradox our time traveler, living on a CTC, goes back
in time and meets his grandfather. Obviously, everything will have to happen
in exactly the same way as recorded in history. In particular, it cannot
happen, on pain of logical inconsistency, that the grandson undertakes actions
that make his own birth impossible. The paradox, as usually formulated, is
that this seems to take away some of the powers of the grandson: surely, one
is apt to argue, he is able to kill his grandfather. So how could it be that
he cannot in fact do so? Stephen Hawking has argued that such paradoxes
threaten time travel with “great logical problems" and that we should hope
for “a Chronology Protection Law, to prevent people going back, and killing
our parents" (Hawking, 1999, [16]). Such a novel Law is not needed, though:
as we shall argue the trivial constraint that everything is well defined and
consistent will do the job.
Before discussing this further, we should mention that a more compli-
cated solution of the paradox was suggested by David Deutsch in his quantum
model of time travel. Here, physical systems can traverse so-called Deutsch-
CTCs that go from one world to another in Everettian many-worlds quantum
mechanics (Deutsch and Lockwood, 1994, [6]). This model connects events
in diﬀerent worlds, and the model therefore basically invokes multiple time
dimensions￿as noted, e.g., in (Dunlap, 2016, [9]). It is true that multidi-
mensional time oﬀers a way out of the grandfather paradox, since the fact
that a grandson killed his grandfather in a world with time t2 does not con-
tradict that his grandfather stays alive in a world with time t1, in which the
grandson was born (cf. Dainton, 2010, [4], p. 123). However, this response
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of invoking multiple time dimensions seems artificial in solving issues with
time travel and, moreover, fails to address the original paradox, in which the
time traveler goes back to his own past in his own time in his own world. It
is only this original paradox that we shall consider here.
An important remark concerning the original paradox, which takes away
some of the puzzlement, was made by David Lewis. As Lewis points out, in
the formulation of the paradox there is an ambiguity in the use of ‘can’ and
‘being able’ (Lewis, 1976, [17]). Of course, the time traveling grandson is able
to kill his grandfather in the sense that he knows how to use a firearm, has the
required muscular strength, training, and so on. But not everything that ‘can’
be done in this sense will actually be done￿we do not at all need to consider
time travel to recognize this and to realize that there is no contradiction here.
In fact, it is a general truth, also in universes without CTCs, that only one
act among all the acts that one is able to do will actually be done. In the
case of a CTC, the grandson can accordingly be assumed to be able to kill
his grandfather, in the sense of possessing the required means and capacities:
he ‘can’ shoot. But at the same time it is impossible that he will actually
do so: if he did, he would contradict the historical record. Accordingly,
no immediate contradiction between ‘can’ and ‘cannot’ arises. According to
Lewis the paradox is therefore only apparent; there is an ambiguity in the
word ‘can’, which is not always visible, but which is highlighted in some
cases￿and it is highlighted very prominently in time travel situations. That
the time travel story does not sit well with common sense is simply because
we are not used to CTC-like situations.
Lewis’ analysis is correct in our opinion, but its emphasis on human acts
and capabilities invites questions, e.g. about the nature of volition and hu-
man powers, that distract from the physical aspects of the problem. We
shall therefore discuss variations on the paradox that only involve physics.
In section 3 we shall consider particles that obey deterministic dynamical
laws; in section 5 we shall consider an indeterministic physical process (like
radio-active decay, governed by quantum mechanics). As it will turn out,
application of a deterministic theory to a spacetime in which there is a CTC-
region leads to a particular kind of indeterminism. In section 4, we shall
compare this CTC-indeterminism to other forms of indeterminism we know
from physics. By contrast, in the case of an indeterministic quantum process,
grandfather-paradox-like reasoning on a CTC will lead us to determinism￿
at first sight in conflict with what the standard interpretation of quantum
mechanics tells us about the essentially indeterministic nature of the theory.
The latter result, the appearance of determinism in an initially indeter-
ministic context, may perhaps be expected since we have already seen that
consistency on CTCs reduces possibilities. That there is also a counterpart
to this, namely the appearance of indeterminism, has also already been in-
dicated, in the previous subsection: beyond the Cauchy horizon there are
worldlines that cannot be fully determined from ⌃. This can be used to
construct examples of indeterminism, even if the local physical laws are de-
terministic.
99
3 From Determinism to Indeterminism
In our construction we shall use the Deutsch-Politzer spacetime explained
in section 2.1. In Figure 4, the chronology violating region (i.e., the region
where CTCs occur) is located to the future of a spacelike hyperplane ⌃. No
worldlines from this region cross ⌃, and in general no wordlines cross ⌃ more
than once. Everything looks therefore “normal” on ⌃, just as on an arbitrary
hyperplane in Minkowski spacetime. However, the initial value problem on ⌃
is not well-posed because ⌃ does not qualify as a Cauchy surface. Indeed, the
standard definition of a (global) Cauchy surface ⌃ in a spacetime manifoldM
is a surface that is intersected exactly once by every non-spacelike curve in
M. It is understandable that initial conditions on such a surface ⌃ determine
all events inM if the applicable laws of physics are locally deterministic, since
the physical state on ⌃ is propagated by these laws along the non-spacelike
curves of M. In the case of a Cauchy surface these curves fill the entire
spacetime. But in the case of Figure 4 there clearly are worldlines that do
not intersect ⌃ and about whose behavior no information is available on ⌃.
Consequently, the state on ⌃ does not contain enough information to fix the
entire global state ofM.
One could say that the CTC-region to some extent forms a world in
itself. It is true that particles can enter the CTC-region from outside, such
as in Figure 5, and it is true that this can be predicted from the initial
conditions on ⌃. However, one may add an arbitrary number of undetermined
worldlines with a particle on it, beyond the Cauchy horizon. This will of
course lead to diﬀerent global states of M, with a diﬀerent total mass and
energy. Therefore, associated with any initial state on ⌃ is an infinitude of
global states of M. This seems a clear case of indeterminism, which will
typically occur in spacetimes in which isolated chronology violating regions
occur. We shall christen this kind of indeterminism “CTC-indeterminism.”
4 CTC-Indeterminism Among Other Varieties
of Indeterminism
In this section we shall compare the indeterminism that we have seen to arise
when CTCs are present with other cases of indeterminism in physics. If the
argument that CTCs can be dismissed because of their exotic and unphysical
features is to work, the indeterminism that arises here should be in a category
of its own, diﬀerent from cases we encounter elsewhere in physics. In order to
see whether this is in fact so, we shall successively review the indeterminism
of Norton’s Dome, the indeterminism of quantum mechanics, that of the hole
argument, and finally the indeterminism of statistical physics.
4.1 Norton’s Dome
Norton’s Dome is an example in which Newton’s second law of motion fails to
have one unique solution (Norton, 2008, [18]). In this case the mathematical
100
condition for the relevant diﬀerential equation to have a unique solution, the
so-called Lipshitz continuity condition, is not satisfied.2
The set-up is as follows. Consider a dome-like surface, as shown in Figure
6, in a uniform gravitational field and with a particle of mass m that can
move on it. The height h(r) of the surface of the dome as a function of the
radial coordinate r, is given by
h(r) =
2↵
3g
r3/2, (1)
where g is the gravitational acceleration, ↵ a proportionality constant.
Figure 6: Norton’s Dome from (Norton, 2008, [18]). The marble at the top of this dome is
initially resting, but will spontaneously￿that is, unpredictably￿roll down the surface, as
shown by the solution 4.
The net force on a particle at the surface will be tangentially directed and
is hence given by
F = mg sin  = mg
dh
dr
= ↵mr1/2, (2)
with   the angle between the tangent and the horizontal direction. Newton’s
second law takes the form of the diﬀerential equation
d2r(t)
dt2
= ↵ r1/2. (3)
If the initial situation is a particle at rest at the top of the dome an obvious
solution of Eq. 3 is r = 0, 8t. However, there are also other solutions with
2The Lipshitz condition is the demand that the slope of the force function does not
become too large. Specifically, a function F satisfies the condition within a certain domain
D iﬀ there is a constant K > 0 such that |F (x)   F (y)|  K|x   y|. For a detailed
discussion, see (Fletcher, 2012, [13])..
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the same initial condition, namely3
r(t) =
⇢
0 if t < T,
↵2
144 [(t  T )]4 if t > T,
(4)
for an arbitrary value of T . Because of the arbitrariness of T , there is an
infinity of possible solutions to this diﬀerential equation. Eq. 4 describes a
particle initially at the origin, which starts rolling oﬀ the surface after the
time T has elapsed. Because the initial conditions do not fix one unique
motion, determinism fails.
When comparing this indeterminism to our case of CTC-indeterminism,
we see that there are various diﬀerences. In the dome case, all possibly rel-
evant initial data have been specified, but the diﬀerential equation is not
able to produce one unique solution from them because the Lipshitz con-
dition is violated. In the CTC case the initial conditions and forces on ⌃
do produce unique worldlines￿Lipshitz conditions are everywhere assumed
to be satisfied. But these uniquely determined worldlines departing from ⌃
do not determine what goes on in the chronology violating region. To know
how many particles find themselves in the handle of Figure 4 we need more
initial data, and these data are not available on ⌃. We can conclude that
CTC-indeterminism is not connected to the violation of a Lipshitz condition.
CTC-indeterminism is therefore essentially diﬀerent from the indeterminism
in the dome case.
4.2 Quantum Indeterminism
The indeterminism of quantum mechanics is given a precise form by the Born
rule, which states that the square of the amplitude of a particular term in
the quantum state (written down as a superposition in some basis) yields
the probability for finding a measurement outcome corresponding to that
term. According to the standard interpretation of quantum mechanics this
probability is fundamental: it is not possible to refine the description by
adding parameters to the wave function, in such a way that the predictions
become more precise than allowed by the Born rule. In other words, even if
the state of a physical system is completely specified, the theory only provides
us with probabilities for a range of possible measurement outcome￿the theory
is thus indeterministic.
CTC-indeterminism and the indeterminism resulting from the Born rule
have in common that in both cases a unique prediction of measurable quan-
tities cannot be fixed by specifying all initial conditions at a given time
(that is, say, on some spatial hypersurface). However, in the case of CTC-
indeterminism the applicable equations do not tell us anything at all about
3This is a solution since
d2
dt2
↵2
144
(t  T )4 = ↵
2
12
(t  T )2 = ↵
s
↵2
144
[(t  T )4 = ↵r1/2,
satisfying Eq. 3..
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probabilities for the diﬀerent possibilities. One may draw an arbitrary amount
of additional causally closed particle worldlines inside the CTC-region, which
corresponds to an infinitude of possibilities, but the equations do not as-
sign any chances to them￿the equations do not speak about probabilities
at all. This is an essential diﬀerence with quantum theory, in which the
laws possess a probabilistic interpretation from the outset. Put diﬀerently,
CTC-indeterminism does not come from the probabilistic character of the
applicable theory, whereas quantum indeterminism does.
In section 5 we will come back to the status of probabilistic theories
when applied to CTC-regions. For now, it suﬃces to observe that CTC-
indeterminism is not similar to quantum indeterminism. In the latter the
specification of probability values is essential, whereas in the former proba-
bilities never enter the discussion.
4.3 The Hole Argument
The hole argument, basically devised by Einstein in 1913, makes use of the
background independence of general relativity, which ensures that all diﬀerent
coordinate systems perform a priori equally well when used to express the
laws of the theory￿there is no a priori given spacetime geometry which
could define a privileged frame of reference and coordinates adapted to it
(Dieks, 2006, [7]). The modern form of the argument was developed by
(Stachel, 2014, [23]) and (Norton and Earman, 1987, [10]), and extensively
used in discussions about substantivalism versus relationism with respect to
spacetime.
We are concerned with only one possible implication of the hole argument,
namely that it proves general relativity to be indeterministic. The argument
is as follows. The spacetime of general relativity in a concrete situation
contains a labeled set of events placed in a manifold, plus a metric field
specifying temporal and spatial relations between the events. Not all the
degrees of freedom in the theory are physical, some of them are concerned
with how the events are placed in the manifold. Because of the background
independence this manifold does not possess a pre-given geometry, so that one
can perform a gauge transformation (an active coordinate transformation)
on this distribution of events￿see Figure 7. All observable properties can be
reduced to combinations of relativistic invariants and are left intact by such a
transformation. If the transformation constitutes a real change in the world
(as the spacetime substantivalist would maintain) then this real change￿a
diﬀerent distribution of matter and energy over the manifold￿cannot be dealt
with by the theory: the initial and boundary conditions do not fix which one
of the diﬀerent possible distributions will be realized. This is because any
two distributions of metric and matter agree on all observational properties,
which are the only properties predicted by the dynamical laws of the theory.
This amounts to indeterminism.
Compared to CTC-indeterminism, this type of indeterminism shares the
characteristic that it leaves open an infinite range of possibilities, and does
not assign any probabilities to these diﬀerent options. Moreover, like CTC-
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Figure 7: The hole argument as presented by Norton (Norton, 2015, [19]). The invariant
aspects of metric and matter fields of particles (here, even entire galaxies) and their
distribution in spacetime are the same, although the events are diﬀerently placed in the
manifold. The transformation from one situation to the other is accomplished by a ‘hole
transformation’ (a diﬀeomorphism) in the area indicated by the dotted line. The question then
is: does the galaxy pass through spacetime point E or not?
indeterminism, hole indeterminism does not depend on violations of Lipshitz
conditions: all diﬀerential equations are perfectly well behaved and have
unique solutions in terms of invariant quantities. It is only because of gen-
eral covariance, relating to the absence of a fixed spacetime background, that
equally valid spacetime representations of the physical situation (character-
ized by invariant quantities) arise￿these representations relate to each other
via diﬀeomorphisms.
The latter observation marks an essential diﬀerence between CTC-indeterminism
and hole indeterminism. In the case of hole indeterminism all diﬀeomor-
phically related possibilities feature exactly the same values of all physical
quantities like energy, mass, etc. For this reason, it may be argued that these
diﬀerent solutions are actually physically identical￿as relationists do. This
is completely unlike the situation in CTC-indeterminism: here the possibili-
ties are uncontroversially physically diﬀerent, distinguishable as they are on
the basis of the numbers of particles inside the CTC-region, the amounts of
mass and energy, and so on. So CTC-indeterminism and hole indeterminism
belong to very diﬀerent categories.
4.4 Lack of Knowledge
When the state of a physical system is incompletely specified, it is to be
expected that its future behavior cannot be fully predicted, even if the appli-
cable laws are deterministic and if the Lipshitz conditions are satisfied. For
example, if we only know the initial positions and velocities of a restricted
number of particles, or only possess estimates for these quantities, Newton’s
equations will not enable us to accurately predict the future state of a many-
particle system. More than one final state will be compatible with the initial
data.
An example of such a situation in physical practice is the micro-description
of systems characterized by macro-quantities, as in statistical physics. Sta-
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tistical physics applies when the number of degrees of freedom of a system
becomes too large to be practically tractable, as in the case of a macroscopic
amount of a gas or the modeling of noise-eﬀects in electronic devices. Al-
though the laws of classical mechanics fix a unique evolution given the initial
state, it is practically impossible to ascertain all individual initial momen-
tum and position values. Statistical physics deals with this by considering
ensembles of possible microstates.
The crucial point is that the macrostate underdetermines the microstate:
there are many microstates that would give rise to the same macrostate.
Hence, statistical physics can be seen as quantifying our ignorance about the
microphysical state. This leads us to a “pragmatic” type of indeterminism:
in the absence of a full set of initial conditions, the future lies open￿in the
epistemic sense.
Clearly, this underdetermination is only to be expected when informa-
tion is missing. The associated indeterminism is consequently harmless from
a fundamental point of view: determinism can be restored by making the
description more complete. In the ontological sense, only one microstate
is actually realized, and this state has a fully deterministic evolution. In
the next section, we argue that this non-fundamental indeterminism is very
similar to CTC-indeterminism.
4.5 CTC-Indeterminism as Epistemic and Harmless
CTC-indeterminism comes about as the result of the existence of Cauchy
horizons, which restricts the amount of information available on spacelike
hypersurfaces￿what is beyond the horizon is hidden from view. This in-
dicates that CTC-indeterminism is of the same kind as the epistemically
founded indeterminism just discussed, and hence of the harmless kind. This
suggestion is supported by our earlier observation that CTC-indeterminism
is fundamentally diﬀerent from more problematic kinds of indeterminism
in physics (Norton’s Dome, quantum indeterminism and diﬀeomorphism-
indeterminism).
Indeed, there is a direct analogy between CTC-indeterminism and the
indeterminism arising from lack of knowledge as in statistical physics. In
statistical physics data about the macrophysics do not fix the initial condi-
tions of microscopic particles; in the CTC case, initial conditions are hidden
from view by Cauchy horizons. Although in statistical physics the microstate
is underdetermined, this does not mean that there is no unique future of the
system ontologically speaking: according to classical mechanics there is one
unique set of initial conditions, one evolution and hence no indeterminism.
In the case of CTC-indeterminism, there is also a fact of the matter con-
cerning initial conditions and the precise shapes of the worldlines behind
the horizon. Just as we can take away the lack of knowledge and the as-
sociated indeterminism in statistical physics by more fully specifying initial
conditions, CTC-indeterminism can be taken away by specifying conditions
beyond the horizon, namely at the upper side of L  of Figure 4 and at ar-
bitrarily small spheres surrounding the two singular points (points on the
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lightcones emerging from these points in Figure 4). These conditions added
to the initial conditions on ⌃ fully complement the initial-value problem and
hence restore global determinism.
Our intuition might suggest that the specification of additional initial con-
ditions on a hypersurface outside ⌃ is unnatural. However, there is nothing
in classical mechanics or relativity theory that implies that Cauchy surfaces
should have the form of global spatial hypersurfaces. Even in classical the-
ory one can easily define situations in which conditions on a plane cannot fix
everything that is going to happen in the future. Think, for example, of a
box with a region in it that is shielded from electromagnetic fields. This is
a topological structure that in relevant aspects is analogous to that of Fig-
ure 4: initial data inside the shielded region will be necessary to achieve a
globally deterministic description. Similarly, taking away indeterminism by
specifying initial conditions in the region behind the Cauchy horizon is the
natural thing to do in time travel situations.
That there may be a need to explicitly look at the perhaps unusual na-
ture of the global situation in order to determine initial conditions may seem
counter-intuitive. However, this feeling is likely due to our impression that
we directly experience the world at large, and have access to infinite space-
like hypersurfaces￿from which we can make predictions. In reality, however,
already special relativity teaches us that we can only have knowledge about
limited spacetime regions so that our actual predictions have a local charac-
ter. In other words, we do not know from experience that there are global
Cauchy hypersurfaces and should be open to the possibility that our world
is diﬀerent. From this perspective, CTC-indeterminism is not stranger and
more worrisome than the indeterminism arising from lack of knowledge in
other areas of physics.
5 From Indeterminism to Determinism
There is an interesting counterpart to the indeterminism that arises in the
presence of CTCs. As we already noted, consistency of histories on CTCs re-
quires that constraints are satisfied that guarantee the uniqueness of events
along each CTC. In the case of, e.g., the grandfather paradox these con-
straints lead to restrictions on what a human agent can do when returning
to his own past￿this suggests a kind of “superdeterminism” that imposes
stronger conditions than what we are inclined to expect. The “lack of free-
dom” that results from this is a well-known reason not to take CTCs seriously.
As noted in section 2.2, appeals to human agency and free will can easily
obscure the physical points that are at stake. Fot this reason we shall analyze
a variation on the grandfather paradox in which a quantum process is consid-
ered instead of the actions of a human time traveler. Think of an electron in
a quantum state that is a superposition of two diﬀerent eigenstates of energy,
both with equal weights, and with energies E1 and E2, respectively. After
some time the electron arrives at a measuring device designed to measure
energy and interacts with it. Quantum theory predicts that there is a 50%
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probability that E1 will be found and recorded, and an equal probability that
E2 will be recorded.4
According to the standard interpretation of quantum mechanics there are
no underlying deterministic factors that determine the outcome of this exper-
iment. The quantum state is taken to contain a full specification of everything
that is relevant to the prediction, and this state only yields probabilities. In
fact, one can derive technical results (Bell’s inequalities and their violation)
showing that the addition of “hidden variables” to the quantum state nec-
essarily leads to theoretical schemes in which the added electron properties
behave in unusual and undesirable ways: the hidden properties cannot be
purely local (i.e., they must exert an instantaneous influence on each other,
even when belonging to physical systems that are far apart). So the indeter-
minism of quantum mechanics is diﬀerent from a simple consequence of a lack
of knowledge of causal factors. If a proof could be given that quantum inde-
terminism nevertheless cannot be fundamental, this would be a far-reaching
result.
Yet, the consistency conditions that are in force on CTCs seem to imply
precisely such a non-fundamentality of quantum mechanical probabilities.
Indeed, when we imagine the above-described experiment on a CTC, exactly
one of the two possible outcomes will be realized￿let us assume it is E1.
Now, in the future of this outcome we return to the same quantum state of
the electron that existed at the beginning of our experiment. Everything will
“repeat itself”, so that the outcome of the experiment will necessarily be E1,
the same as before. So there is no question of any probability or uncertainty:
the outcome is completely fixed; this is logically forced due to the consistency
constraints. Since there is only one unique outcome event on the CTC, with
unambiguous properties, we have to conclude that this outcome is determined
tout court : what is recorded at the end of the experiment is an intrinsically
fixed and determined event and there is no place for indeterminism.
If this argument is correct, the feeling that CTCs should be banned from
physics by the introduction of a “chronology protection principle” may well be
justified. Indeterminism as a possible fundamental feature of physical reality
would be disproved by a simple CTC thought experiment. This seems to fly
in the face of an enormous amount of foundational work in quantum theory.
So this version of the grandfather paradox, even though not threatening
inconsistency, seems worrisome￿at least at first sight.
6 Determinism versus Determination
The argument that CTCs are “unphysical” because of CTC-determinism, like
the earlier argument from indeterminism, relies on the supposition that we
4The frequently discussed case of a superposition of spin states, e.g. the singlet state,
is basically identical. It is important to note that the predictions for the outcomes of
measurements made by quantum mechanics do not depend on the presence of human
observers; quantum predictions are statements about what is recorded by macroscopic
measuring devices, regardless of whether a conscious agent becomes aware of the outcomes..
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are facing a consequence that only arises in the presence of CTCs. We have
argued that this strategy does not work in the case of CTC-indeterminism,
because this indeterminism also occurs in other situations and is considered
harmless there. We will argue now that the case of CTC-determinism does
not fare better. As a first step we shall show that in many cases CTC-
determinism merely exemplifies a kind of logical determination that trivially
characterizes physical processes in general and does not conflict with physical
indeterminism.
To see the diﬀerence between physical determinism and determination,
think of Minkowski spacetime (Newtonian spacetime will do as well) with a
fundamentally indeterministic physical theory defined on it. Physical inde-
terminism implies that the complete physical state at a certain instant does
not completely fix, via the laws of the theory, the physical state at later
instants: more than one later states are compatible with the initial state
according to the theory in question. Nevertheless, the later states are deter-
mined in a trivial, logical sense: they are exactly what they are and nothing
else. This is just the requirement of unambiguity of events that is needed to
make sense of the idea of four-dimensional spacetime at all. If there were no
unique physical state of aﬀairs at each spacetime point, we could not have a
well-defined history of the universe.
The indispensability of this kind of unambiguous determination is espe-
cially clear within the conceptual framework of the so-called block universe,
associated with the “B-theory” of time. According to this B-theory there are
no absolute ontological distinctions between Past, Present and Future, and
the whole of history can be thought of as laid out in one four-dimensional
“block”. Evidently, all events in this block must be determined in the sense
just mentioned. It is true that in the literature this has sometimes been
taken to entail that the block universe necessarily is subject to determinism.
However, this is now generally recognized as a fallacy, at least if physical de-
terminism is meant (cf. Dieks, 2014, [8]). Indeed, the block universe exists,
according to the B-theory of time, independently of whether the events in it
are generated by deterministic laws, of a theory like classical mechanics, or
by indeterministic laws like those of quantum mechanics. The crux is that
the distinction between physical determinism and physical indeterminism is
a distinction between two diﬀerent kinds of relations between physical states:
in the deterministic case the laws of the theory make exactly one later state
compatible with the earlier one, in the indeterministic case there are more
later states compatible with the earlier one, according to the theory. By
contrast, in the case of logical determination the question of what physical
theory applies is not relevant: for an event to be determined in this logical
sense it is suﬃcient that the event is well defined, regardless of its relations to
other events. Any bona fide unambiguous event is determined in this sense.
This argument may seem to rely on the B-theory of time and the asso-
ciated ontology of the block universe, but on closer inspection it does not.
Even if one subscribes to the “A-theory of time”, and accordingly believes
that there are ontological diﬀerences between Past, Present and Future, it
remains tautological that each future event will be exactly and uniquely what
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it will be, and that past events were exactly what they were. This tautol-
ogy merely requires that there is exactly one history of the world. So even
here, all events are determined in the logical sense, regardless of whether a
deterministic or an indeterministic physical theory applies.
Now think back of our thought experiment involving an electron on a
CTC. We assumed that indeterministic quantum theory governed what hap-
pened in the experiment. This means that the physical state of our electron
before its interaction with the measuring device is compatible with diﬀerent
measurement outcomes. This is an assumption about the relation between
two diﬀerent states, defined at two diﬀerent temporal stages of the experi-
ment: the laws of quantum mechanics do not completely fix the measurement
outcome when given the initial electron state as their input. This relation
between the initial and final physical states is objective and unambiguously
defined, even on a CTC: when in thought we follow the electron in its history,
we return to exactly the same states as before when we arrive at the same
points in the electron’s existence. So the relation between any two states
is uniquely defined. This relation can certainly be the indeterministic one
specified by quantum mechanics. Nevertheless, the final outcome of the ex-
periment is unambiguously determined since it corresponds to the single and
unique measurement event (that we encounter again and again when we let
our mind’s eye traverse the CTC various times).
This is fully analogous to what takes place in situations without CTCs.
It is perhaps easiest to recognize this by again thinking of the block universe:
according to quantum theory there are probabilistic relations between the
physical properties instantiated at diﬀerent spacelike hypersurfaces in this
universe, but nevertheless these physical properties are unambiguously and
uniquely determined in themselves. As we have already mentioned, the same
argument can be used even if the notion of a block universe is rejected and
some version of the A-theory of time is adopted. Accordingly, if we accepted
the principle to brand as unphysical processes that are governed by indeter-
ministic physical theories but are nevertheless fully determined in the logical
sense, we would have to throw out all of physics.
However, this is not the whole story. The plausibility of the argument that
CTCs lead to (super)determinism also derives from the fact that information
about the final outcome may already be present when the experiment starts.
For example, we might imagine that the outcome is recorded in a book,
which survives along the CTC and can be consulted at the beginning of the
experiment. In this case it seems natural to assume that the physical state at
the moment that the experiment starts contains this information, so that it
becomes possible to derive the experiment’s outcome from this initial state.
This then appears to lead to physical determinism after all.
In order to discuss this argument and its relevance for the acceptability
of CTCs we have to delve a bit deeper into the question of what the physical
laws on the CTCs look like, and whether these laws enable us to predict the
outcome of experiments from their initial states as just indicated.
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7 Prediction and Retrodiction on CTCs
Suppose that the quantum experiment that we described in the previous
section, with possible outcomes E1 and E2, is performed on a CTC and has
the actual outcome E1. Suppose further that a record of this is preserved
along the CTC, up to the point at which the experiment is about to start.
The total physical state at this point on the CTC does not only comprise
the state of the electron, but also the record that reveals the outcome of
the experiment. Therefore, in spite of the fact that the quantum state of
the electron can only provide us with probabilities, the total state makes it
possible to predict with certainty what the outcome of the experiment will
be.
It should be noted that for this “deterministic” prediction the quantum
state is not needed at all: the record does not supply a piece of missing infor-
mation that is needed to supplement what is given by the quantum state, but
does all the predictive work on its own. Logically speaking, this is not diﬀer-
ent from the laboratory situation (without any CTCs) in which a quantum
experiment is done, its outcome noted down, after which the record is put in
an archive from which we can retrodict the outcome even many years later.
This retrodiction does not rely on a quantum mechanical calculation using
the later state of the electron (if it still exists), but is based on the classical
behavior of records. Books and similar records are designed to be more or
less permanent and to follow the deterministic laws of classical physics to a
very high degree of approximation. If we only had the later quantum state
of the electron to guide us, we would not be able to retrodict unequivocally
what the experiment’s outcome was; what makes the retrodiction reliable
is the approximately classical behavior of the record. The situation in our
thought experiment on the CTC is very similar. It is not the case that quan-
tum theory has ceased to be applicable, but an additional factor has come
into play, namely the presence of a classical deterministic record. When the
experimenter consults the book, at the beginning of the experiment, and
notes the recorded outcome, she is engaged in exactly the same activity as
an observer who consults his notebook in our Minkowski-like world to see
what has happened. So just as we are not entitled to conclude that reliable
retrodiction falsifies the fundamentally probabilistic nature of quantum me-
chanics in our world, can we draw that conclusion in the case of the CTC
thought experiment.
One might object that the CTC experiment is essentially diﬀerent from
the familiar retrodiction case: what is at stake is not retrodiction at all but
rather prediction of the outcome of an experiment, on the basis of the initial
physical state. But this counterargument does not succeed: the reliability
of the statement that the outcome of the experiment will be as the book
indicates, derives solely from the book’s reliability as a retrodictor, in the
same way as in the case without CTCs. The future-directed aspect only
comes in because of the uniqueness (and determination) of events along the
CTC: as it happens, the retrodicted event is the very same event as the
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future result of the experiment. So it is the combination of retrodiction and
determination that is at work here, and not some new physical principle of
prediction.
This becomes more transparent when we ask whether there are reasons
to assume the existence of new lawlike physical principles on the CTC. For
example, will there be a law telling us about the future? This should not
be expected. It is not a general feature of CTCs that there are notebooks
or similar records of the eventual outcome available at the beginning of each
experiment￿these may well have been erased or eroded long ago, if they ever
existed at all. There is no reason to assume new regularities on CTCs that
ensure that records will be more stable than usual; quite the opposite, if the
outcome is to be recorded at the end of an experiment, any already existing
record will have to be erased before. It is perfectly consistent to assume the
usual laws of physics on CTCs plus the boundary condition of periodicity,
i.e. the consistency constaints, without worrying about any new laws.
The consistency conditions that apply in worlds with CTCs thus need not
be regarded as symptoms of the existence of novel physical principles, as has
sometimes been suggested in the literature.5 They just reflect uniqueness of
events and, indeed, consistency; they have a logical rather than a physical
character. There are no fixed patterns of events connected to them. The
most one can say is that these consistency conditions enforce a violation of a
principle that one is inclined to employ in calculations in which no CTCs are
involved, namely that arbitrary initial conditions can be imposed locally￿
one only needs to think of rolled-up Minkowski spacetime to see that not all
such specifications will lead to the periodical solutions that we need to be
consistent.
The idea (which we argue is violated in the CTC-case) that arbitrary
initial conditions can be imposed locally has been formulated by Deutsch
and Lockwood (Deutsch & Lockwood, 1994, [6], p. 71), which they have
called the Autonomy Principle:
it is possible to create in our immediate environment any config-
uration of matter that the laws of physics permit locally, without
reference to what the rest of the universe may be doing.
It is true that we are not used to constraints on local initial conditions￿but
then again, we are not used to taking into account global considerations at all.
5For example, Earman (Earman, 1995, [11], p. 194) writes: “Indeed, the existence of
consistency constraints is a strong hint￿but nevertheless a hint that most of the literature
on time travel has managed to ignore￿that it is naive to expect that the laws of a time
travel world which is nomologically accessible from our would will be identical with the
laws of our world. In some time travel worlds it is plausible that the MRL laws [Mill,
Ramsey and Lewis, or the “best systems account"] include the consistency constraints; in
these cases the grandfather paradox has a satisfying resolution. In other cases the status
of the consistency constraints remains obscure; in these cases the grandfather paradox
leaves a residual itch. Those who wish to scratch the itch further may want to explore
other analyses of laws. Indeed, time travel would seem to provide a good testing ground
for competing analyses of laws.” In our view, the consistency constraints merely reflect
consistency, which of course has to be satisfied as a trivial logical principle anyway, and
do not introduce new laws of physics..
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But, in principle, this is mistaken even in worlds without any CTCs, as we
shall note in the Conclusion. At the end of the day, the constraints in question
are nothing but the expression of ordinary physical laws in combination with
the principles of logic and do not require new principles of physics.
8 Conclusion
Common sense may rule out such excursions￿but the laws of physics do not.
￿David Deutsch & Michael Lockwood (1994, p. 69).
The potential existence of closed timelike curves poses a challenge to our
intuitions concerning determinism and indeterminism. Physical processes in-
side a time travel region must satisfy consistency conditions, which constrain
the dynamics, and on the other hand the existence of Cauchy horizons implies
a lack of predictability. However, when judging the seriousness of this con-
flict with intuition we should not forget that our common-sense notions about
(in)determinism and predictability derive from untutored interpretations of
everyday experience.
One such untutored common-sense idea is that we have immediate access
to a global now, a plane, from which the world develops to its future states.
Relativity theory has taught us that this notion is mistaken: we do not have
epistemic access to a global now at all because of the existence of a finite
maximum speed of signal propagation, and ontologically the theory does not
single out preferred now-planes. In keeping with this, we should adapt our
ideas about causality from global to local notions. It is a basic message of
relativity theory that criteria for determinism should first of all depend on
local considerations, and not on considerations about the possible existence
of global nows in the universe.
CTC-indeterminism hence turns out to be similar to a familiar and harm-
less type of indeterminism that occurs in many other places in physics. It
is very diﬀerent from the varieties of philosophically interesting indetermin-
ism that have been focused on in the recent literature, and rather represents
another instance of epistemically grounded lack of predictability that is per-
vasive in physics. From a local point of view, everything is completely deter-
ministic and the lack of global predictability can be rectified by adding extra,
not yet considered initial conditions. CTC-indeterminism is therefore not the
extraordinary new phenomenon that it sometimes has been suggested to be.
Something similar can be said about the determinism in the sense of “lack
of freedom” that results from consistency constraints on CTCs. What we are
facing here is basically determination of events at the level of logic, instead
of physical determinism. Also in this case there is no reason to think that
new physical principles, too strange to be true, have to be invoked.
Summing up, both CTC-indeterminism and CTC-determinism do not
involve new principles or new laws of physics; although intuitively strange
at first sight, analysis shows that they are of the same kind as cases already
familiar from well-known and accepted applications of physical theory. As a
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consequence, there is no justification for the argument that we are here facing
phenomena that are so exotic that their potential presence suﬃces to rule
out CTCs. What the prima facie implausibility of CTC-determinism and
CTC-indeterminism shows is that we have not yet succeeded in adapting our
intuitions to the world of general relativity￿and that we are unexperienced
with traveling through time.
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